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## Zoning's Centennial: A Complete Account of the Evolution of Zoning into a Robust System of Land Use Law—1916-2016 (Part I)

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# ZONING AND PLANNING LAW REPORT

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## ZONING'S CENTENNIAL: A COMPLETE ACCOUNT OF THE EVOLUTION OF ZONING INTO A ROBUST SYSTEM OF LAND USE LAW—1916-2016 (PART I\*)

John R. Nolon<sup>1</sup>

### I. The Need for Public Regulation of Land Use — The First Comprehensive Zoning Law<sup>2</sup>

Zoning, narrowly defined, is the division of a community into districts in which the uses of land and the size and location of buildings are prescribed. Understood more broadly, zoning includes any local regulations that achieve the most appropriate use of the land. In practice, zoning controls the quantity and quality of what is built on the American landscape and what is preserved.

2016 is the 100th anniversary of the adoption of the first citywide comprehensive zoning law. Its original purpose was to create districts that separated incompatible land uses and building types in order to protect property values and promote the health, safety, and welfare of the community. 100 years later, zoning is used to achieve an impressive number of public objectives such as permitting transit oriented development, creating green infrastructure, preserving habitat, species, and wetlands, promoting renewable energy facilities, reducing vehicle miles traveled, and preserving the sequestering landscape.

Zoning's progress has been a long and dramatic journey. What was considered the appropriate use of the land in 1916 when the nation's population was 102 million<sup>3</sup> differs greatly from today's

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\*Dear Reader: Please note that this is the first part of a four part series of articles that will span through the next 4 issues starting with this October, Volume 39, Issue 9 release and ending with the January, Volume 40 Issue 1 release.



notions—with over 300 million people,<sup>4</sup> many of whom are abandoning rural communities and remote suburbs and moving into denser urban areas seeking livable, transit-oriented neighborhoods and settling in close proximity on land whose natural resources must be preserved for their health and enjoyment.<sup>5</sup> One hundred years ago, the challenge concerned civil engineering and city building in urban areas; today it focuses on all aspects of land development and natural resource conservation in rural, suburban, and urban settings: all challenged by global warming.

Zoning grew abruptly out of the recognized power of local governments to protect residents from nuisance-like land uses and to achieve an appropriate scale of development in selected neighborhoods. Local officials understood that the ponderous process of civil law nuisance suits between individual property owners was not sufficient to protect larger areas within their jurisdictions. Locally legislated height restrictions, for example, were validated in 1909 by the U.S. Supreme Court.<sup>6</sup> In 1915, the Court upheld use restrictions that prohibited

downtown riding stables<sup>7</sup> and brick manufacturing in Los Angeles.<sup>8</sup>

These early precedents, however, fell far short of creating comprehensive standards for city building designed to protect property owners and neighborhoods from incompatible land uses. This changed when the first comprehensive zoning law was adopted by New York City. A new subway system, the construction of new high rise buildings, the rapid expansion of the garment district, and increasing congestion in the streets struck fear into the hearts of building owners and businesses on Wall Street and in the posh Fifth Avenue retail neighborhood. They called for reform, a study was done, a commission established, hearings held, and on July 25, 1916 the City was ready with an ordinance, which was adopted by the Board of Estimate and Apportionment by a vote of 15 to one.<sup>9</sup> This was the first zoning ordinance of its kind in the U.S., regulating land uses and building types in all neighborhoods of the City.

## II. The Delegation of Legal Authority to Adopt Zoning<sup>10</sup>

Cities are not sovereign entities; they get their legal authority from the state. New York City's zoning law, for example, was enabled by a 1913 act of the state legislature, which amended the City's Charter to authorize it to control land use.<sup>11</sup> Following New York City's action, zoning spread quickly. Twenty state legislatures, plus the District of Columbia, followed suit by adopting some form of zoning enabling act by 1921. In other states, many localities rushed to adopt zoning laws in the absence of state authority, risking invalidation due to their lack of legal authority. The need for enabling acts in all states and for a uniform and effective method of delegating control of land use to municipalities led to the promulgation of a model zoning enabling act by a national commission in 1921.<sup>12</sup> By the mid-1920s, over 500 local governments had adopted comprehensive zoning laws.<sup>13</sup> Their authority

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to do so was granted by enabling acts originally drafted by the federal government and then adopted by their state legislatures.

Although the federal government has limited power to regulate local land uses, it has an important role to play in enabling, guiding, and assisting local governments to exercise their delegated power wisely. Zoning's story illustrates the powerful influence that the federal government can wield if it plays this facilitative role strategically. In the case of zoning's adoption, the story involves the federal Department of Commerce.

As Secretary of Commerce under presidents Harding and Coolidge in the 1920s, Herbert Hoover paved the way for the rapid adoption of zoning. Hoover noted "Our cities [do] not produce their full contribution to the sinews of American life and national character" and these "moral and social issues can only be solved by a new conception of city building."<sup>14</sup> His response was to appoint two advisory committees: one to write a standard building code and another to draft model zoning and planning statutes to be adopted by the states, in their discretion.

The latter committee was called the Advisory Committee on City Planning and Zoning; it appointed a subcommittee on laws and ordinances, which produced a final draft of a 17-page enabling statute called Standard State Zoning Enabling Act Under Which Municipalities Can Adopt Zoning Regulations.<sup>15</sup> The draft was released by the Commerce Department on September 15th, 1922.<sup>16</sup> It contained nine sections, including the grant of zoning power to local governments; a provision that the local legislature could divide the city into districts, or zones; a statement of zoning's purposes; the creation of a zoning board of appeals, and procedures for establishing, waiving, and amending those regulations.<sup>17</sup> By the end of 1927, over half of the states had adopted some form of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act.

The success of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which requires that zoning conform to a comprehensive plan, paved the way for another act, A Standard City Planning Enabling Act, intended as a companion to the Standard Zoning Enabling Act.<sup>18</sup> The Standard City Planning Enabling Act was to provide for the creation of such plans and to effect the coordinated and harmonious development of cities. It covered several major topics:<sup>19</sup>

- the adoption of and recommended content of a "master" plan;
- the creation and operation of a planning commission;
- the adoption of a street plan, or official map;
- involvement of the planning commission in approving public improvements;
- planning for the subdivision of land into marketable parcels; and
- the voluntary creation of a regional planning commission and a regional plan.

After its publication in 1928, the Standard City Planning Enabling Act was not as widely implemented by state legislatures as was the Standard Zoning Enabling Act. Some felt that a city-wide zoning ordinance embodied a sufficient comprehensive plan and that a separate plan was not needed and then, of course, land development and land use planning significantly ceased from the stock market crash in 1929 to the end of World War II in the mid-1940s.<sup>20</sup>

All 50 states have adopted some form of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act and most have adopted a version of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act. In many of these states, the initial enabling acts were virtual verbatim versions of the Commerce Department's drafts and a surprising number of them retain a significant amount of that original content today.

The standard acts recognized the political nature of controlling private land use and the great diversity among municipalities in every state; as a result, their provisions are largely voluntary. Under their terms, zoning and comprehensive plans may be adopted. The American land use system today largely retains this opt-in feature with notable exceptions.

The original approach to zoning and planning raises many questions:

- How can a system of law that relies on localities with limited geographical jurisdictions properly serve the needs of larger regions;
- Was it wise to separate land uses into prescribed districts, within which standards must be uniform;
- Did such uniformity unduly constrain the organic process of growth and produce an artificial settlement pattern;
- How can the flexibility needed to respond to unique market and geographical conditions be realized under such a rigid system of law;
- Did zoning protect the urban poor and public health by preventing congestion, overcrowding, and blight, or is it overly protective of property investment and values;
- Was is it prudent to empower locally-elected legislators to adopt land use regulations without mandating the adoption of a comprehensive plan prepared by a less political body; and, of course,
- Was the separation of land uses into districts constitutional: did it violate landowners' due process or equal protection rights or was it a taking of property without just compensation?

### III. Zoning was Contagious, but was it Constitutional?<sup>21</sup>

There was much to be worked out as zoning entered its second decade in 1926, when the question of zoning's constitutionality reached the U.S. Supreme Court. By the mid-1920s, zoning had been challenged in several state courts with split results. A majority of the courts that considered early zoning laws agreed with *State ex rel. Carter v. Harper*, which upheld "so-called zoning" against takings, equal protection, and due process claims.<sup>22</sup> Several quotes from the case explain this result: In *Harper*, the court established that ". . .the rights preserved to the individual by these constitutional provisions are held in subordination to the rights of society."<sup>23</sup> Further, the case held that "[t]he purpose of the law is to bring about an orderly development of our cities. . . .Everyone who has observed the haphazard development of cities. . .has appreciated the desirability of regulating the growth and development of our urban communities."<sup>24</sup> Ultimately, the court raised a critical question: "When we reflect that one has always been required to use his property so as not to injure his neighbors. . .can it be said that an effort to preserve various sections of a city [from harmful intrusions] is unreasonable?"<sup>25</sup>

Other courts agreed with Judge Offutt, who wrote in *Goldman v. Crowther*: "This ordinance at a stroke arrests that process of natural evolution and growth, and substitutes for it an artificial and arbitrary plan of segregation. . . ."<sup>26</sup> He further noted ". . .it has never been supposed in this state that the police power is a universal solvent by which all constitutional guarantees and limitations can be loosed and set aside, regardless of their clear and plain meaning. . . . [T]hose limits . . . must bear some substantial relation to the public health, morals, safety, comfort or welfare."<sup>27</sup> Thus, ". . .so much of the ordinance



as attempts to regulate and restrict the use of property in Baltimore City is void.”<sup>28</sup> The court found that the ordinance itself did not contain adequate provisions demonstrating that it was bottomed on legitimate public interests.<sup>29</sup> On its face, the separation of land uses into zones was void in Maryland.

Such was the legal background when, in my imagination, the CEO of Ambler Realty Co. awoke one morning in the early 1920s to learn from the local newspaper that its 68-acre property in the Village of Euclid, Ohio was been divided into three separate zoning districts under the zoning ordinance adopted by the Village Board of Trustees the previous evening.<sup>30</sup> Outraged by this unprecedented interference with his industrial development plans and the resulting substantial diminution of the value of his property, he brought suit claiming that zoning, on its face, was a deprivation of private property without due process.<sup>31</sup> The affected parcel had been listed and sold for industrial development.<sup>32</sup> It was situated next to a railroad and in the “path of progressive industrial development.”<sup>33</sup> Yet, the new zoning law limited its use, in substantial part, to residential and retail purposes at significantly lower market values. The question, wrote the U.S. Supreme Court, was whether “the ordinance [is] invalid, in that it violates the constitutional protection ‘to the right of property in [Ambler Realty] by attempted regulations under the guise of the police power, which are unreasonable and confiscatory.’”<sup>34</sup>

The Court noted “while the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operations.”<sup>35</sup> Invoking the law of nuisance and the “painstaking considerations” found in the reports of various planning and land use commissions and experts, which concur in the view that the segregation of dif-

ferent land uses serve many public interests, the Court found zoning constitutional.<sup>36</sup> And, it did so by firmly establishing the standard still used today in determining whether a zoning regulation is valid exercise of local police power: “The reasons . . . [supporting the separation of land uses could not be said to be] clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.”<sup>37</sup>

In this way, the judicial attitude toward zoning was fixed: courts would presume the constitutional validity of zoning, defer to the findings of local legislatures, and impose on the challenger a heavy burden of proving that zoning was unreasonable and arbitrary. However, when a property owner challenges zoning not on its face, as in these cases, but rather as applied to a particular parcel, it is somewhat easier to carry this burden of proof. In *Nectow v. City of Cambridge*, the Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance that subjected the petitioner’s property to use restrictions that were unreasonable.<sup>38</sup> The petitioner’s burden of proof was carried when it demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court that “no practical use can be made of the land in question,” and that the use permitted “would not promote the health, safety, convenience, and general welfare of the inhabitants of that part of the defendant city.”<sup>39</sup>

These bookend principles raised countless questions, the answer to which would have to wait more than two decades while land use law essentially slumbered during the Great Depression and World War II. After a decade of post-war development, the consequences of what became known as Euclidian Zoning could be assessed. Was the rigid separation of land uses into discrete zones effective or, in Judge Offutt’s terms, did it arrest “that process of natural evolution and growth” to the detriment of society?<sup>40</sup>

#### IV. The Unintended Consequences of Euclidian Zoning<sup>41</sup>

Following the decision in *Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.* in 1926,<sup>42</sup> land use lawyers and planners celebrated the advent of a new, comprehensive method of shaping human settlements and protecting investments in the built environment. However, their excitement was short-lived. In 1929, the stock market crashed and land development moved at a snail's pace until the end of World War II.<sup>43</sup> The growth rate in housing units increased by 40% in the 1950s over the 1940s, putting much more pressure on the land use regulatory system at mid-century.<sup>44</sup> We had to wait until this growth was absorbed to see what zoning had wrought.

The Standard Zoning Enabling Act, as adopted by most state legislatures, seemed simple enough.<sup>45</sup> It permitted local governments to separate land uses into use districts or zones within which they may regulate the construction and the use of buildings or land.<sup>46</sup> The Act stipulated, "regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout [each] district."<sup>47</sup> Existing patterns of land use in 1926 were disorganized and chaotic in urban areas, a consequence of the unplanned results of countless unguided private sector land use decisions.

What would neighborhoods look like after being filtered through a zoning ordinance that channeled like-kind land uses into geometric-shaped districts, governed by bulk and area standards, limited lot sizes and coverage, and building heights and set-backs: standards that must apply uniformly to all parcels within the district? Much of what concerned zoning in its inception had to do with civil engineering, traffic concerns, such as ensuring fire truck access to buildings during fires; designing streets and driveways to reduce accidents; and limiting house heights to 35 feet, so that they were tucked under the tree canopy of the neighborhood to preserve community character.

Euclidian zoning seemed well named, as lawyers and planners first drew the shapes this law seemed to dictate. The geometry was not flexible, due in part to the adherence of judges to Dillon's Rule, under which courts were obliged to read literally the laws that delegate power to local governments.<sup>48</sup> How much uniformity was optimal; what would the legacy of uniformly regulated neighborhoods be?

After World War II, growth pressures in suburban communities intensified due to the return of the soldiers, affordable federal mortgages, and the 1956 Federal Highway Act that allowed city dwellers to abandon cities in record numbers. This migration rapidly revealed the designs that zoning created. Much of the land in developing communities was zoned for single-family housing on relatively large lots, large enough to permit builders to use septic systems and individual wells, thereby reducing the capital infrastructure costs to the municipality. These homes were uniformly sized and their shape was dictated by zoning's area and bulk requirements.

There was a certain sameness to many of these emerging neighborhoods. As they expanded outward, commutes lengthened, increasing vehicle miles travelled and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions; impermeable lot coverage intensified stormwater runoff and flooding; open space shrunk and, with it, wetlands and habitats; housing became less affordable, creating racially imbalanced neighborhoods; the lack of workers repelled employers, reducing jobs and property tax revenues; municipal services became more expensive; and the character of communities changed, not always to the liking of those who lived there. In response, land use lawyers and planners began to tweak the legal framework to achieve more flexibility in permitted development.

As the century progressed, zoning's weaker sibling—land use planning—became a larger factor in land use law. The adverse effects of

promulgating the Standard City Planning Enabling Act after, instead of before, the Standard Zoning Enabling Act were better understood. Day-to-day zoning decisions needed to be guided by a vision for the city or town's future; adopting a comprehensive land use plan gave citizens and local officials a method of accomplishing that in addition to mitigating the unintended consequences of Euclidian zoning. Some states stipulated that the local planning commission or a special advisory committee should formulate and adopt the comprehensive plan, insulating the planning process somewhat from electoral politics and tying zoning's conformance to an apolitical document. Communities that took planning seriously and conformed their zoning to their plan learned that they had protected zoning from a variety of challenges, including due process and *ultra vires* claims. If a zoning provision furthers a comprehensive plan objective, it is less likely to be invalidated for failing to further a legitimate public objective or failing to be within the legal power of the locality to enact.

That zoning was to reach beyond civil engineering and fire safety was embedded in the Standard City Planning Enabling Act. As a predicate for zoning, it provided that plans will, "in accordance with present and future needs, best promote health, safety, order, morals, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development. . . ."<sup>49</sup> The purposes of planning were broad. Zoning had to conform. The stage was set for the adoption of flexible zoning and land use strategies that moved beyond the rigid contours of Euclidian zoning.

The Neo-Euclidian era began as zoning turned 40, roughly a decade after the post-war experiments with the original model. Its failures led to a variety of legal remedies—all experiments in search of proper development patterns. Courts slowly moved past Dillon's

Rule and some state legislatures changed the law, calling for a liberal interpretation of the strict language of the enabling act, and others delegated new powers to localities to mitigate the cookie-cutter results of the Euclidian era.

## V. The Most Appropriate Use of the Land<sup>50</sup>

Immediately after WWII, Euclidian Zoning was not working for the Village of Tarrytown, New York. The Village needed workers to attract employers to build its tax base. For political and economic reasons, it decided not to zone large areas for multi-family housing. Instead, in 1947, the Village board of trustees created a floating garden apartment zone, which allowed landowners who owned ten acres of land or more to apply for the floating zone to alight on their property; a unique two-step process that was clearly not within the specific delegated power of the Village under the state zoning enabling act.<sup>51</sup> The foundation for this creative zoning technique was laid in the Village's comprehensive plan, which identified the need for affordable housing and an effective means to provide it. The Village knew that a straightforward rezoning of land to multi-family use would greatly increase its value and adversely affect the desired affordability. Following this enactment, the owner of an eligible parcel successfully applied for rezoning.

In *Rodgers v. Tarrytown*, the plaintiff, who owned six acres nearby, pointed out that nothing in New York's zoning enabling act expressly authorized the Village to first create a multi-family zoning district and then, later, apply it to a parcel in a single-family district after consideration of an application made by the parcel's owner.<sup>52</sup> In the view of the Euclidians, zoning districts were to be changed by amendments to the zoning map, adopted at the same time as the provisions regulating land uses were changed.

The state's highest court disagreed with the



plaintiff, and broadly interpreted the creative authority of local governments. The court noted that “zoning is by no means static. . . [c]hanged or changing conditions call for changed plans.”<sup>53</sup> And, further, “The village’s zoning aim being clear, the choice of methods to accomplish it lay with the board.”<sup>54</sup> With these words, the Neo-Euclidian period began.

The dissent in *Rodgers* spoke for the conservative interpretation of the enabling act. It argued “the device. . . most assuredly is not ‘zoning.’”<sup>55</sup> It feared that upholding floating zoning could “well prove to be the opening wedge in the destruction of effective and efficient zoning in this State.”<sup>56</sup> The dissent called this an *ultra vires* act, one that created a nonconforming use in an established zone for the benefit of the owner of a single parcel (also known as “spot” zoning), or gave the legislature the power to grant variances, a power reserved to the zoning board of appeals.<sup>57</sup> For all these reasons, the dissent believed that the creation of a floating zone was not within the delegated authority of the board of trustees.

The rationale of the majority in *Rodgers* was on sound footing. The Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which was adopted nearly in its entirety by the New York legislature, contains this provision: “Such [zoning] regulations shall be made. . . with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the community.”<sup>58</sup> This language was included in most of the zoning enabling acts adopted by state legislatures throughout the country.

If floating zoning was not zoning, in the dissent’s view, what was it? Perhaps this 1951 case sufficiently broadened the term zoning so that, over time, it became land use law. Today, we use land use law, including floating zones and its many siblings, to create sustainable neighborhoods, permit community solar facili-

ties, and promote mixed-use developments oriented to transit. Beyond this first flexible tool, the courts and legislatures have added many more to the land use toolbox: special use permits, overlay zoning, planned unit development districts, receiving and sending zones for the transfer of development rights, growth control ordinances, density bonuses in exchange for affordable housing, and a host of additional Neo-Euclidian devices.

As this century progresses, land use law is becoming an essential strategy for mitigating and adapting to climate change. By properly shaping settlement patterns, it can greatly decrease per capita carbon emissions, water use, energy consumption, and impervious coverage, which causes flooding. Today, lawyers practice land use law—not zoning—thanks, in part, to the *Rodgers* holding and similar decisions in other states. Law and planning students go far beyond memorizing and applying the holding in *Euclid* and now study dozens of land use techniques. The practice of land use law today focuses on shaping settlement patterns to achieve “the most appropriate use of the land” in an era fraught with frightful challenges.

## ENDNOTES:

<sup>1</sup>Distinguished Professor of Law, Counsel, Land Use Law Center, Elisabeth Haub School of Law. The author acknowledges the significant work of his research assistants, Allison Sloto, Kara Paulsen, and Ollia Pappas.

<sup>2</sup>See John R. Nolon, *Historical Overview of the American Land Use System: A Diagnostic Approach to Evaluating Governmental Land Use Control*, 23 Pace Env’tl. L. Rev. 821 (2006) [hereinafter *Historical Overview*].

<sup>3</sup>*Historical National Population Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1999*, U.S. Census Bureau, <https://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/totals/pre-1980/tables/popclockest.txt> (last updated June 28, 2000).

<sup>4</sup>*U.S. and World Population Clock*, U.S. Census Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/popcl>

ock/ (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).

<sup>5</sup>See *Growth in Urban Population Outpaces Rest of Nation*, U.S. Census Bureau, Mar. 26, 2012, [https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010\\_census/cb12-50.html](https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html).

<sup>6</sup>Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).

<sup>7</sup>Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).

<sup>8</sup>Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).

<sup>9</sup>N.Y.C., N.Y. Building Zone Resolution (July 25, 1916).

<sup>10</sup>*Historical Overview*, *supra* note 1.

<sup>11</sup>N.Y. Gen. City Law §§ 19-20 (McKinney 1913) (amended 2003).

<sup>12</sup>See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1922).

<sup>13</sup>*Historical Overview*, *supra* note 1.

<sup>14</sup>Regional Plan of New York and its Environs, *Plan of New York and its Environs; the Meeting of May 10, 1922*, 15, <https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.li5jlc;view=1up;seq=3>.

<sup>15</sup>See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, *supra* note 13.

<sup>16</sup>*Id.*

<sup>17</sup>*Id.*

<sup>18</sup>U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Standard City Planning Enabling Act (1928).

<sup>19</sup>*Id.*

<sup>20</sup>F. John Devaney, Tracking the American Dream 50 Years of Housing History from the Census Bureau: 1940 to 1990, 54 (1994).

<sup>21</sup>See John R. Nolon, *Comprehensive Land Use Planning: Learning How and Where to Grow*, 13 Pace L. Rev. 351 (1993) [hereinafter *Comprehensive Land Use Planning*].

<sup>22</sup>State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. 451 (Wis. 1923).

<sup>23</sup>*Id.* at 453.

<sup>24</sup>*Id.* at 454-55.

<sup>25</sup>*Id.* at 455.

<sup>26</sup>Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 53 (Md. 1925).

<sup>27</sup>*Id.* at 55.

<sup>28</sup>*Id.* at 60.

<sup>29</sup>*Id.*

<sup>30</sup>Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 380-83 (1926).

<sup>31</sup>*Id.* at 384.

<sup>32</sup>*Id.*

<sup>33</sup>*Id.* at 383.

<sup>34</sup>*Id.* at 386.

<sup>35</sup>*Id.* at 387.

<sup>36</sup>*Id.* at 394.

<sup>37</sup>*Id.* at 395.

<sup>38</sup>Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).

<sup>39</sup>*Id.* at 187.

<sup>40</sup>Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 53 (Md. 1925).

<sup>41</sup>*Comprehensive Land Use Planning*, *supra* note 18.

<sup>42</sup>Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

<sup>43</sup>F. John Devaney, *supra* note 15, at 8.

<sup>44</sup>*Id.*

<sup>45</sup>U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1922).

<sup>46</sup>*Id.*

<sup>47</sup>*Id.*

<sup>48</sup>1 J. Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 237 (5th ed. 1911).

<sup>49</sup>U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Standard City Planning Enabling Act (1928).

<sup>50</sup>See John R. Nolon, *The Law of Sustainable Development: Keeping Pace*, 30 Pace L. Rev. 1246 (2010) [hereinafter *Keeping Pace*].

<sup>51</sup>Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 732-33 (N.Y. 1951).

<sup>52</sup>*Id.* at 733.

<sup>53</sup>*Id.*

<sup>54</sup>*Id.* at 733-34.

<sup>55</sup>*Id.* at 736.

<sup>56</sup>*Id.*

<sup>57</sup>*Id.* at 736-39.

<sup>58</sup>U.S. Dep't of Commerce, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1922).

